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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
In this paper I intend to examine the influence of con-
stitutional equality principles on choice of law decisions in
the United States and Europe. Therefore, this analysis is an
exercise in constitutional law, conflict of laws and compara-
tive law.
Part I is an inquiry into the origin, role and contem-
porary significance of an important part of the United States
Constitution and its guarantees of equality. However, I do
not intend to deal here exhaustively with all the aspects of
the non-discrimination clauses: my goal is to clarify the
implications of contemporary Fourteenth Amendment theory for
state autonomy in deciding conflict cases. Therefore, I will
concentrate on state discrimination against non-residents and
aliens.
Under settled principles of judicial review, the Supreme
Court is empowered to define the obligations that anti-
discrimination principles impose upon the states. The court
has developed a multi-tiered approach whereby different tests
are used according to the degree of "suspectness" of legisla-
tive classifications. As we will see, non-residency, unlike
alienage, has not been held to be a "suspect classification"
and is thus not subject to strict Equal Protection scrutiny.
However, I will argue that the classifications that
I
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distinguish locals from out-of-staters are, in my opinion,
suspect and that they should, therefore, be subjected to the
highest scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
In Part II, I will attempt to describe traditional and
modern choice of law methodologies in the United States. As
we will see the influence of the United States Constitution
in this area is mainly exercised through the limitations it
places on the power of the states to shape their own choice
of law rules. The measure of federal control by the Supreme
Court has varied from time to time and from field to field.
But so far, the Supreme Court has not invalidated a state's
choice of law decision on the basis of either antidiscrimina-
tion provision.
I will argue that several modern theories, because of
their systematic preference for forum residents, violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and
that it is time for the Supreme Court to control this ten-
dency.
In Part III, I will make a brief comparative analysis of
the European conflicts system. I will point out the basic
differences between American and European choice of law
methodologies. The European reaction to the American
"Conflicts Resolution" and its influence on European choice
of law methodologies will be examined. Another interesting
question is whether the European Community has any impact on
choice of law decisions made by its Member States.
3Finally, I will discuss the decisions of the German Con-
stitutional Court, establishing an interaction between con-
stitutional equality principles and choice of law rules.
PART I. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
CHAPTER A
INTRODUCTION TO EQUAL PROTECTION
The first and basic step in Equal Protection analysis
must consist of looking at the concept of equality as such.
Equality is the only concept that tells us that dif-
ferent treatment of people does matter. It is the concept
that forces us to consider how society treats people in
relationship to one another. It forces the government to
justify inequalities that might otherwise go unnoticed or
unremedied.1
We all implicitly have an idea of what "equality" means.
We know what equal and unequal mean by having learned since
childhood how to use them in countless spheres of everyday
life: Equality is the relationship of identity that exists
among two or more persons or things by reference to a given
standard of measure. The standard of measure may be specific
or implied. However, we tend to neglect what equality
2means.
But, equality cannot be used as a talismanic incantation
to decide controversies. Therefore, it is necessary to ex-
amine the underlying substantive rights that conflict.3
Although it will not automatically resolve the con-
flicts, a knowledge of the history of the idea of equality
4
5may also be helpful in establishing a perspective within
which partial solutions may be achieved a little more
'I 4eaSl y.
One of the roots of the idea of equality lies in the ex-
perience of the ancient Hebrews in their covenant with God.
Under the covenant, God governed through his law which was
binding on all and thus a moral guarantee to all of equal
justice.
To the Athenians of the Fifth Century Before Christ,
equality had much of the meaning which it possesses for us
today.5 Aristotle, building on the work of Plato said two
things about equality that have dominated Western thought
ever since: "Equality in morals means this: things that are
unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their un-
alikeness. Equality and justice are synonymous: to be just
is to be equal, to be unjust is to be unequal."6
The Christian contributions to the idea of equality were
important and farreaching. St. Paul wrote to the Galatians:
"There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor
free, there is neither male nor female: for ye we are all
one in Christ Jesus."
It may be reassuring to many to discover how old
and pertinent the idea of equality is. It possessed a
considerable history before it received characteristic
statement in the great legal and political documents of the
718th Century. The Declaration of Independence numbered
6among its self-evident truths that "all men are created
equal."8
The drive to abolish slavery culminated in a civil war
and three amendments to the Constitution. One of these
amendments, the fourteenth, contains the one explicit
guarantee of equality that: "No State shall deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."9
In recent years the Equal Protection guarantee has be-
come the single most important concept in the Constitution
for the protection of individual rights.
State regulations are commonly placed in one of three
categories for the purpose of Equal Protection analysis:
(1) Regulations affecting the exercise of
"fundamental rights."
(2) Regulations classifying people on the basis of
criteria that are constitutionally suspect.
(3) All remaining regulations.IO
An important factor, in determining how much further the
Supreme Court will go in enforcing rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment, is the opinion of its new Chief Justice in
this respect. Chief Justice Rehnquist has described the
Supreme Court's decisions, with the exception of those in-
volving classifications based on race, as an "endless
thinkering with legislative judgments, a series of
conclusions unsupported by any guiding principle. "12 His
scrupulously drafted dissents have proliferated in response
7to the majority's propensity toward invalidating legislative
1 'f' t' b d 'II ' , I' 13c aSSl lca lons ase on sex, 1 egltlmacy or a lenage.
The constitutional ideal of equality seems problematical
14in two fundamental aspects:
(1) The fact that virtually all governmental action
involves the making of choices and the drawing of
lines in ways that entail favoring some over
others. The Equal Protection clause then permits
the judiciary to step in and trump the freedom of
the political system to make these choices.
(2) The fact that the Equal Protection clause is
supposed to play itself out in a universe in which
individuals create inequalities themselves because
of the pre-existing or background system of
individual freedom.
At what point then, must the government or the judiciary
, fl h' l't' ?15 f'lntervene to atten out t ese lnegua 1 lese Let us lrst
go back to the framers to examine the standards for judicial
review they had in mind while drafting the Fourteenth Amend-
mente
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CHAPTER B
THE INTENT OF THE FRAMERS
To understand the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, a
9
constitutional historians that the Fourteenth Amendment had
The Civil War Amendments grew out of the conflict be-
These anti-
The evil sought
enforce the common law concerning access to public
against systematic private discrimination by refusing to
accommodations; common carriers and other community
its abolition was not to wait upon individual conversion; it
liberty and equality as primary arguments to overturn
slavery. 5 Slavery was still an ethical and moral evil but
to be redressed was the state's failure to protect blacks
b d b l't' I ' 6was to e roote out y po 1 1ca act1on.
cal and moral evils of slavery to a program which employed
institution of slavery. There exists strong agreement among
this period, an important reorientation of the abolitionist
3movement took place from that of private conversion to
public action.4 The shift entailed a change from a program
slavery origins go back to the period of 1835-1838. During
, , .. , h . 1 21ts ma1n or1g1n 1n t e ant1-s avery movement.
which used equality and liberty as aides to attack the ethi-
tween the ideals of the Declaration of Independence and the
document written more than a century ago, it is necessary to
understand the period in which it was written. 1
10
facilities for the benefit of blacks and whites alike the
state's failure to provide "Equal Protection of the laws."7
The words of the Equal Protection clause are general
and, when read literally, express no limitation on the equal
8protection which states are forbidden to deny. The clause
means exactly what its language says: namely, that any person
coming within the jurisdiction of a state has the right to
the same protection of the laws of that state as the state
extends to other persons within its jurisdiction. It does
not mean that the laws must be the same: only the protection
must be the same.9
In spite of its clear language, there has been much
scholarly controversy over the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In "Government by the Judiciary,"
Raoul Berger argues that the Equal Protection Clause was in-
tended to prohibit only racially partial legislation that af-
fects specific civil rights concerning the security of person
and property, provided in the Civil Rights Act of 1866.10
Berger says further that the provision of section one does
not empower Congress to enact laws for direct enforcement
thereof: "To convert 'no state shall deny' into 'Congress
shall make' does violence to the text."ll
This construction has been successfully challenged else-
where on a number of grounds:
(1) Bickel argues that the framers did not simply use the
language of the Civil Rights Act, because they were
aware it was a Constitution they were writing: an
organic document that because of its unique function and
permanence must contain language which allows for future
11
unforeseen problems. In his view the framers did what
they intended to do: propose a genef21 constitutional
prohibition of inequality under law.
(2) Ten Broek argues that the protection of the laws must be
supplied. In other words, the absencI30f all protectionis a ground for federal intervention.
(3) Dimond says that Berger's interpretivist theory of
judicial review fails to comprehend the Supreme Court's
institutional mission such as its role in articulating
the con~emp?~ary meaning of sweeping phrases like Equal
Protectlon.
There exists a rather serious question whether anyone
today can hope to accurately discern the intent of the
majority of people responsible for the proposal and ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. IS As Terrance Sandelow put
it "to ask in each instance, whether the framers intended the
specific or the general is to pose a question that almost in-
variably is unanswerable."16
In my opinion, although section one had a core focus
with respect to racial discrimination, the framers con-
sciously used broad language to comprehend new circumstances,
experiences and insight.
12
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CHAPTER C
JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OF LEGISLATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS
The Equal Protection Clause has meaning as a legal force
only to the extent courts give it that effect.1
Therefore, judicial review under the Equal Protection
Clause raises broad problems as to the respective roles of
courts and legislatures.2
It is possible to rationalize all Equal Protection deci-
sions as judicial determinations of whether the government
has fairly classified persons.3 At this point, the demand
for equality confronts the right to classify.4 The Equal
Protection Clause does not reject the government's ability to
classify persons or draw lines in the creation and applica-
tion of laws, but it does guarantee that those class-
ifications will not be based upon impermissible criteria or
b' '1 d b d f . d' 'd 1 5ar 1trar1 y use to ur en a group 0 1n 1V1 ua s.
The Equal Protection doctrine of the Supreme Court has
6undergone rapid and drastic transformations in recent years.
Prior to the Warren Court the Equal Protection Clause played
a very minor role outside racial discrimination cases.7 Only
a minimal judicial intervention was supported; the courts in-
sisted merely that the classification in the statute
"reasonably relate to the legislative purpose."8 Very little
attention was paid to whether the legislative purpose itself
14
15
was valid.9 Only in racial discrimination cases did the
courts apply a stricter scrutiny due to the historical back-
ground of the Fourteenth Amendment.10
The principal way in which the Clause gained new
vitality during the Warren era was by means of a broadened
view of when a statutory classification should be subjected
t t' t' 11 h .11o s rlct scru lny. T e courts Wl not accept every per-
missible government purpose as sufficient to support a class-
ification under this test, but will instead require the
government to show that it is pursuing a "compelling" or
"overriding" end -- one whose value is so great that it jus-
tifies the limitation of fundamental constitutional values.
The courts will furthermore not defer to the decision of the
other branches of government but will instead independently
determine if the classification is necessary to promote such
II' 't t 12a compe lng ln eres .
Strict scrutiny under the Warren Court was imposed when-
ever either the classification was a suspect one because it
discriminated against a politically powerless or unpopular
minority, or that classification had an impact on a fundamen-
1 . h . t 13ta rlg t or lnteres .
In actual fact the Warren Court found only race and na-
. 1 " t b t 1 . f' . 14 h f dtlona orlgln 0 e suspec c aSSl lcatlons. T e un amen-
tal interest ingredient of the new Equal Protection doctrine
was particularly open-ended, but the list of interests iden-
tified as fundamental by the Warren Court was quite modest:
voting, criminal appeals and the right of interstate
1615travel. In all other contexts, the "old" rational
has refused to extend the suspect label to classifications
also probably in the areas of illegitimacy classifications,
the Court would uphold the classification only when the
21sex.
standards of the old Equal Protection doctrine proceeded to
f· d h .. I 241n t e statute unconst1tut10na .
Court, even while voicing the traditional "mere rationality"
Also, there were a number of cases in which the Burger
employed was "substantially related" to an "important
governmental objective."23
government could demonstrate that the classification it had
Most clearly in the area of gender based classifications, but
The Burger Court has, however, added an intermediate
standard of review to the Warren Court's two-tier approach.22
At the end of the 1960's, it was possible to do a
What has been the response to the Warren Court's
legacy?19 The Burger Court has declined to expand the Warren
based on illegitimacy and
doctrine in the ways that Warren-era opinions suggested the
doctrine might ultimately evolve.20 In particular, the Court
detailed analysis of all Supreme Court Equal Protection deci-
Bickel wrote that "a broadly conceived egalitarianism was the
main theme in the music to which the Warren Court marched."IB
relationship test reigned with "minimal scrutiny in theory
and virtually none in fact."16
sions in terms of a two-tiered model involving the rational
relationship test and the strict scrutiny test.17professor
17
As a result, the most important thing that one can say
about the Burger Court's performance in Equal Protection is
h 1 'h 'd' " 1 25t at Equa Protect1on as rema1ne an 1ntervent1on1st too .
It is hard to predict at this point what the Equal
formulated dissents, he argued that the rational basis test
have serious implications: members of "discrete and insular"
is the only proper standard of review where racial dis-
In his opinion, states
The possibility of a Supreme Court majority subscribing
past, Chief Justice Rehnquist has been adamantly opposed to
to this interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause will
minorities, who have turned to the judicial system because
relief was not available from the democratic process, will
f' d h '11 281n t e courts unrespons1ve as we .
the three-tier approach of the Burger Court. In carefully
should be given maximum leeway to determine the best solution
to their problems.27
,. " '1' d 26cr1m1nat1on 1S not 1mp 1cate .
Protection doctrine of the Rehnquist Court will be. In the
18
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CHAPTER D
APPLICATION OF CLASSIFICATIONS UNDER THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
Throughout American history aliens have been subjected
to numerous restrictions imposed by Congress and State Legis-
latures.I One area of particular complexity concerns state
and federal laws which discriminate against aliens. These
alienage cases raise unique problems of federalism.2In 1886,
the Supreme Court held that aliens are "persons" so as to en-
joy the protection of the Equal Protection Clause.3
In 1971, the Supreme Court declared that "classifica-
tions based on alienage are inherently suspect and subject to
close judicial scrutiny."4 In reality, however, the Court's
scrutiny is not as strict as in cases involving class-
ifications based upon race or national origin.S Alienage
classifications are special in two respects:
(1) the concept of citizenship itself implies the
existence of a favored status for members of a
specified group; and
(2) alienage is not an irrevocable personal trait.6
The Supreme Court has chosen not to analyze all alienage
classifications in terms of a single standard of review.7
Instead the Court has employed a more lenient standard of
review -- the traditional rational basis test -- in two
cases:
20
21
(1) Local governments may require U. s. citizenship
as a condition of obtaining a government position
"ultimately relat§d to the process of democratic
self-government."
This exception is premised on the view that the
distinction between citizens and aliens, irrelevant
in other contexts, is fundamental to the definition
and government of a state. This is paradoxal,
however, because the suspect classifications device
was intended specifically to protect minorities ~ot
adequately safeguarded by the political process.
The trend has been toward broadening this
exception, one result of which has been to diminish
the national treatment of aliens which is more
explicitly provided to some nationalitierowithin
U.S. jurisdiction by bilateral treaties.
(2) Because of the important nature of the federal
interest in foreign affairs and foreign relations
as well as the federal power to regulate immigra-
tion and naturalization, alienage classifications
by federal tfW are subjected only to the rational
basis test.
The use of a preemption standard, however, would
justify the Court's differential treatment of state
and federal alienage classifications, a difference
that i~ a£~malous under Equal Protection
analysls.
22
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CHAPTER E
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NON-RESIDENTS
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United
States Constitution explicitly prohibits state discrimination
against the citizens of other states.1Although the Clause
only speaks of "citizens of each state," as a practical mat-
ter residence and citizenship are interchangeable.2
Non-residents possess two characteristics that generally
call for some special attention:
(1) they lack the right to vote; and
(2) ~hey a:e.vul~erable to local prejudice or
lnsenslvlty.
The Framers adopted the constitutional ban on dis-
crimination against non-residents primarily as an instrument
of national unification.4 Hamilton deemed the Privileges and
Immunities Clause "the basis of the union."S And as Profes-
sor Ely put it "by constitutionally tying the fate of out-
siders to the fate of those possessing political power, the
Framers insured that their interests would be well looked
6after.
When a non-resident is discriminated against, the case
could in theory be actionable under the Equal Protection
Clause as well as under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.7 But each clause has a separate history of judicial
enforcement of the principle barring discrimination on the
basis of state residence.8
23
24
State discrimination with respect to non fundamental ac-
required to justify the discrimination under the minimum
Non-residency (unlike alienage) has not been held to be
In such a case the state is only
The fundamentality doctrine of the Privileges and Im-
The current Privileges and Immunities doctrine rests ap-
d ,. Cl 14an Immunltles ause.
(1) the Court inquires whether non-residents were "a
peculiar source of the evil the law sought to remedy," and
tal right is involved, the Court applies the following test
tivities does not fall within the purview of the Privileges
a "suspect classification" for Equal Protection scrutity but
1 t t' I' . 9on y 0 mere ra lona lty reVlew.
plication of the clause on whether or not the Privilege of
Immunity claimed is fundamental.10 Assuming that a fundamen-
rationality standard of review of the Equal Protection
Clause.1S
(2) the Court further inquires whether the discrimina-
tion against non-residents bore "a substantial relal~onship"
to the problem the statute was attempting to solve.
"intermediate level of scrutiny" under the Equal Protection
Clause.13
strict scrutiny test. The doctrine resembles closely the
rationality review, is not as rigid as the Equal Protection
munities Clause, although considerably stricter than minimum
to determine whether the discrimination against non-residents
11was acceptable:
25
As a result, the Supreme Court now interprets the Equal
Protection Clause to limit state power to discriminate
against in-state aliens more severely than it has ever
limited state power to discriminate against out-of-state
citizens under both the Privileges and Immunities and the
Equal Protection Clause!16
26
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CHAPTER F
THE RIGHT TO INTERSTATE TRAVEL
The Freedom of interstate migration is not explicitly
given by any constitutional provision.1The reason for this
exclusion is not clear:
(1) It is possible that the Framers believed it to be
so basic a right that it did not need to be expressed in the
text of the Constitution.
(2) Another possibility is that the Framers considered
this guarantee to be2included in the other protections givenby the Constitution.
But the Supreme Court has always treated this right
to travel as "fundamental" and thus triggering strict Equal
.. 3Protectlon scrutlny.
Shapiro v. Thompson is widely considered the classic
case illustrating the right to interstate travel.4 In that
case, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional state and
federal provisions denying welfare benefits to individuals
who had resided in the administering jurisdiction less than
5one year.
The majority held that because the right limited (the
right to travel) and the right denied (the right to welfare
benefits) were "fundamental rights," the classification had
to be invalidated unless it was shown to be "necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest."G
27
28
The Court declined to locate this right to travel in
any particular constitutional clause. Rather the Court
recognized that the "nature of our Federal Union and our con-
stitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require
that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and
breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules or regula-
tions which unreasonably burden or restrict the movement."?
Later cases have construed Shapiro to mean8 that the
right to travel is impaired, whereever it is "penalized,"
even if there is no actual deterrent effect on interestate
.. 9 h h 1 h .. 11 .mlgratlon. But t e Supreme Court as a so sown ltS Wl lng-
ness to permit, without triggering strict scrutiny, minor im-
pairments of the right to travel.lO
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CHAPTER G
CONCLUSION
TOWARDS A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY
I think that the authors of that notable instrument
(the Declaration of Independence) intended to include all men
but they did not intend to declare all men equal in all
respects. They did not mean to say all men were equal in
color, size, intellect, moral developments or social
capacity.
They defined with tolerable distinctness in what
respects they did consider all men created equal -- equal
with certain inalienable rights, among which are life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
This they said and this they meant. They did not mean
to assert the obvious untruth that all were then actually en-
joying that equality, nor yet that they were about to confer
immediately upon them. In fact, they had no power to confer
such a boon. They meant simply to declare the right so that
enforcement of it might follow as fast as circumstances
should permit.l
How progressive were we in the enforcement of that right
during the 130 years that passed since these famous words
were written by President Lincoln? This was the major
problem of this first part of my analysis.
30
31
First, the equality ideal was placed in its historic
context: the Fourteenth Amendment, the one explicit
constitutional guarantee of equality, obviously had a core
focus with respect to racial discrimination. But the Framers
consciously used broad language to comprehend new cir-
cumstances, experiences and insights.
Then, the different standards of judicial review used by
the Supreme Court were examined: the rational relationship
test, the strict scrutiny test and the intermediate standard
of review. The conclusion was that at this point it is hard
to predict what the Equal Protection doctrine of the
Rehnquist Court will be.
Furthermore, the specific problems of classifications
based on residence and alienage were considered. The conclu-
sion was that the Supreme Court now interprets the Equal
Protection Clause with respect to discrimination against in-
state aliens more severely than it has ever interpreted the
Privileges and Immunities or the Equal Protection Clauses
with respect to discrimination against out-of-state citizens.
Finally, the existence of a limited right to travel was
proven.
As a result, Americans generally seem more concerned
with the idea of liberty, which they identify with absence of
government, than with the idea of equality.
In my opinion, the Court has not over-extended the Four-
teenth Amendment: A sweeping guarantee of protection from
stigmatization and oppression was narrowed into a protection
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of certain kinds of discrimination and classification. And
the Privileges and Immunities Clause has never been a
meaningful vehicle for judicial review of state actions.
However, in no country are the needs of the interstate
system more important than in the United States, where busi-
ness and social activities almost ignore state lines.
Therefore, I believe that the Court, in deciding the
reasonableness of classifications based on residence, has
been too deferential to state legislatures. Limiting the
protection of local laws to local people is obviously ra-
tional under traditional tests but somehow that seems
unsatisfying: Decreasing the significance of state residence
tends to strengthen interstate attachments and thereby
diminishes the likelihood of interstate conflicts.
One way of doing this is by broadening the fundamental
right to travel. Another possibility is to stop interpreting
the Privileges and Immunities Clause as being limited to
"fundamental rights." But I prefer yet another method:
classifications that distinguish locals from out-of-staters
are suspect and should therefore be subjected to the strict
scrutiny test of the Equal Protection Clause.
What is now the relevance of this Equal Protection
analysis to choice of law decisions? This will be the
central question in the following chapters: To be examined
is the extent to which a state may make choice of law
decisions that apply its domestic law to extrastate events
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involving its own residents but refuse to make similar ap-
plications of its law to residents of other states.
In the conflicts context one will not ordinarily deal
with laws that on their face limit their protection to lo-
cals. Therefore, choice between the two basic principles of
a Federal Union --- equal treatment and the advancement of
local values --- should be avoided wherever possible. But no
choice of law methodology can harmonize these two principles
in all cases. Accordingly, every conflicts approach decides
which principle is ultimately to be preferred.
The Supreme Court has not yet limited a state's choice
of law on the basis of the Equal Protection or the Privileges
and Immunities clauses. The following chapters will be a
plea for the Court to take up that responsibility.
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PART II. EQUAL PROTECTION AND CHOICE OF LAW
CHAPTER A
INTRODUCTION: SETTING THE STAGE
In the adjudication of any case, a court is called upon
to effectuate two basic but opposing objectives: to achieve
justice in the individual case and to protect the interests
of society in the integrity of its legal system.1 Extended to
their extremes, societal needs would best be advanced by
rigid rules; conversely complete justice in the individual
case would often call for ad hoc decisions.2
When critical elements in a legal relationship transcend
a single jurisdiction, a conflict of laws case may arise.3
The problem then becomes whether to ignore the foreign ele-
ment and to treat the case as arising under local law, or to
seek an accommodation between the forum and the foreign legal
system by giving weight to the foreign element and applying
foreign law.4
Conflicts of law has always struggled with the hopeless
task of solving, with local territorial means, an essentially
international problem, namely to assure that the same case
will be decided everywhere according to the same law.5
Therefore, conflicts is an area of the law noted for
disputations over theory.6 Basically, however, there are two
groups in conflict of law thinkers:
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(1) the "forum faction" thinks that the forum should
apply foreign substantive law only by way of exception.
(2) the "substantivists" would like to see the crea-
tion of new rules of substantive private law to decide the
7case.
In the United States, facts or contacts with legal
systems/territorial other than the forum raise conflict of
law concerns primarily in three different situations:
(1) whether a court can appropriately entertain a
case which has a foreign contact, i.e., jurisdiction.
(2) if a court does hear a case, to what extent does
the law of another state or country have claim to considera-
tion, i.e., choice of law.
(3) if a court hears a case, what is the effect of
the determination or judgment in another state or country,
i.e., recognition and enforcement of judgments.8
The second question, namely the choice of law problem,
is the subject of this analysis.
In the United States, the principle source of choice of
law rules is state law.9 Each state determines whether in a
given case its courts should apply substantive rules taken
from one or another of the state legal systems, from federal
law or from a foreign legal system.lO
Except when Congress has occupied the field, a federal
court, too, must in diversity cases apply the choice-of-law
rules of the state in which it sits.ll
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The influence of the United States Constitution is
mainly exercised through the limitations it places on the
power of the states to shape their own choice-of-Iaw rules,
to the detriment of other states of the Union, and much more
important, to the detriment of the federal symbiosis of
12states. However, in this area there is still little
authoritative guidance.13
The last thirty years have witnesses a fundamental
change in the landscape of choice of law doctrine in the
United States.14 Most of the efforts of the past decades have
been to escape from the traditional choice-of-Iaw rules.15
Under the traditional approach, to a given set of facts
the rules of substantive law of that state which enjoys an
intimate relationship with the issue at hand are applied be-
cause of the existence of a given fact: the so-called "point
of contact." The substantive laws of all states are treated
equally since they are all applied according to the same
'f t 16 h' I' h h I f I I .p01nt 0 contac. T 1S exp a1ns w y t e ru es 0 ex OC1
--- the law of the place where the act occurred was the law
with the point of contact --- developed in the United
States.17
These rules trace their history back to Europe in the
Middle Ages. Until then, the courts generally applied lex
fori, the law of the forum adjudicating the case. With the
rise of international commercial transactions, it became
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important to recognize the law of the country in which the
disputed act had occurred.18
Traditional choice of law in the United States has, fur-
thermore, reflected the tension between the relatively
flexible doctrine of comity and the more rigid concept of
vested rights. Comity as a choice of law mechanism in the
United States is generally traced to the writings of Joseph
Story in the early 1800's.19 Comity, he said, refers to the
paramount obligations of nations to give effect to foreign
law when that foreign law is appropriate for the case. That
obligation rests on the forum's voluntary consent to apply
that law, given in order to do substantial justice. As a
result, rights acquired within the boundaries of a country
, d th' I'd' b f' 20retalne elr va 1 lty ecause 0 comltas.
This concept was transmitted by Holland, an English
legal philosopher, to Dicey, who used it to develop his
doctrine of vested rights:21 "Any right duly acquired by the
law of any civilised country is recognized ... by the
English courts."22
Joseph Beale, a highly influential American conflict-of-
laws theorist during the early 1900's further developed the
concept of "vested rights." He insisted that once a right is
lawfully created in a given jurisdiction, it must be recog-
23nized and validated everywhere. Beale codified the vested
rights approach in the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws
(1934) .24 That document thus became responsible for implant-
ing in American law a continental dogma which, by then, had
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long been discarded in the countries of its origin.25 Namely,
the vested rights theory has been subjected to attack as ex-
plaining only why foreign law should be applied and not when
foreign rights should be recognized and protected by the lo-
cal forum.26
The same was true of yet another American doctrine of
that time: "the local law theory" of Judge Learned Hand and
Walter Wheeler Cook27 which saw the sole source of conflicts
law in the law of the forum: no foreign law was actually ap-
plied. Rather, the court created its own law patterned after
the foreign model.28
The local law theory too has been subjected to criticism
as leaving the courts without a guide as to which law they
should apply. Legislators, judges and scholars have sought
new answers.
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CHAPTER B
REVOLUTION AND COUNTERREVOLUTION IN CHOICE OF LAW
But their criticisms, however effective, were largelyt' 6~cs.
Several commentators criticized these judicial gymnas-
Traditional conflict of law thinking, as exemplified by
Revolution" consists of doctrinal writings and case law which
have influenced American practice since the late fifties.
The development started in the thirties, when a number of
What has been described as the American "Conflicts
benefits claimed for the First Restatement's system for
the First Restatement, was dominated by the search for sen-
distinguished law teachers began to criticize the traditional
way of solving conflict of law problems. 1
sible and clear rules leading to the application of the same
law wherever multiple contact cases arose.2 The principal
negative, until 1933 when the first major breakthrough came
choice of law are ease of administration, predictability and
uniformity (or forum neutrality).3
However, the system of escape devices substantially un-
dermined predictability and forum neutrality. 4 Innovative
courts resorted to such escape devices as characterization,
renvoi and public policy to avoid literal application of the
rules which would lead them to inequitable and unjust
5results.
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with David Cavers seminal "Critique of the Choice-of-Law
7Problem." The chief defect of the traditional systems,
Professor Cavers argued, was that they were designed in terms
of "jurisdiction selecting" rules which purported to lead to
the applicable law irrespective of its content: "The Court
must blind itself to the content of the law to which its rule
or principle of selection points and to the result which that
law may work in the case before it.,,8 Cavers seemed to sug-
gest that choice of law be made in each case with a view to
doing justice between the parties.9 The central example he
used in the 1933 article was modeled on the case Milliken v.
Pratt10 and contained in it the seeds of the Currie revolu-
tion.11 But, it was not until a quarter of a century later
that this "false problem" case was recognized to be a "no
conflict" or "false conflict" case, the abiding cornerstone
f 1 . 1 . 12o governmenta lnterest ana YS1S.
Professor Brainerd Currie announced his governmental in-
terest analysis for choice of law problems in 1958. He wrote
several articles most of which were collected in a book,
13"Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws."
Basically his interest analysis applies in a series of
steps: First forum law is applied unless the law of another
state is claimed. If such a claim is made, the court then
determines whether, given the policy purposes of the con-
flicting laws and the state's contacts with the dispute, each
state has an interest in applying its law. At this point,
there are three possible situations:
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(1) False conflict: only one state is interested
and that state's law will be applied.
(2) No conflict: no state is interested and forum
law will be applied.
(3) True conflict: the situation in which the
applicable laws of two or more states connected
to the dispute differ and each state has an
interest in applying its policy. Currie's
controversial proposal was t~at in such cases
forum law would be applied.
The decision of the New York Court of appeals in Babcock
J k 15 .. d h d l' f h' f 1v. ac son ~gn~te t e mo ern revo ut~on 0 c o~ce 0 aw
in the courts. The coincidence of the publication of
Currie's collected writings and the decision in Babcock is,
.... f' 16~n retrospect, qu~te s~gn~ ~cant.
Since then, interest analysis has become a term employed
to describe perhaps a dozen different methods. Each method
generally agrees on the process of identifying interests and
on the recognition and resolution of false conflicts.17 But
interest analysis breaks into discretely different methods
because of the variety of techniques for breaking true con-
flicts.
Basically, however, there are two groups of interest
analysis defenders:
(1) The orthodox whose prophet remains Brainerd
Currie perhaps with a few modifications and
reservations.
(2) The reformists who start from other premises:
the~ mo~~fy the ingredients but stick with the
rec~pe.
Interest analysis, even if restricted to false con-
flicts, has been critized since its inception by a
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"counter-revolution" led mainly by advocates of rules for
choice of law problems. In summary, the following are the
... d h' .. 19maJor crltlcs an t elr maln pOlnts:
(1) Cavers, after starting the conflicts revolution
returned to ~8rritorially based "principles of
preference."
(2) Rosenberg argued that governmental interest
analysis ignores legislative policies favoring
simplicity, predictability and multistate
harmony, while it necessitates subje2tive andtherefore dangerous value judgments.
(3) Scoles and Hay discussed the almost insoluble
dilemma facing courts attempting to determine
the policies and relative interests of relevant
states, 22sulting in unpredictable and ad hoc
results.
(4) Ehrenzweig noted that Currie's analysis relied
on governmental interests while most conflicts
cases reso~~e disputes that concern only private
interests.
(5) Brilmayer argued that Currie had a preconceived
notion of what state interests ought to be and
that he followed those a priori beliefs rather
than following actual legis~~tive intent or even
likely constructive intent.
(6) Kegel questioned the idea underlying the
doctrine of governmental interests that states
are interested in realizing certain policies by
means of the application of their own sub-
stantive ~3w to cases involving foreign
elements.
(7) Korn proposed that the common domicile of the
parties should be the preeminent choice of law
rule, based on the concept of a social contract
and consent of the governed, as well as corn
munallY2ghared goals, conditions and concepts of
morals.
(8) Leflar identified five "choice influencing
considerations" that he perceived as2, "workingbasis" for judicial decision making.
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(9) Reese, the reporter of the Second R2§tatement,favored the increased use of rules. Beginning
in 1953, the American Law Institute labored for
seventeen years to produce the first official
draft of the new Restatement. The final produce
was published in 1971 and reflects the period's
mood of flexibility and openness to new ideas,
while refusing to abandon past learning and
remaining committed to the principle of decision
according to rules to the extent that29atisfac-tory rules exist or can be developed.
The Second Restatement's approach to choice of law ques-
tions is basically the following:
(1) A court must follow the statutory choice of law
rule if one is available.
(2) If there is no statutorily directed choice, the
Restatement provides specific rules to resolve
some issues.
(3) For most issues, however, the Restatement
prescribes that the law of the state with the
"most significant ~5lationship" to that issue
should be applied.
The ultimate goal is the development of a large number of
relatively narrow rules that will be applicable only in
precisely defined situations.31 The argument for such a
rule-oriented choice of law method is based on the belief
that rules channel the application of policy in ways that
h' 'd d' t b'l' 32ac leve certalnty an pre lC a 1 lty.
The coincidence of the development of interest analysis
and the Second Restatement provoked widespread re-examination
of the choice-of-law question.33 The basic dispute in the
United States today is whether the development of rules
should be the ultimate objective in choice of law or whether
cases should be decided on a case by case basis after con-
sideration of certain enumerated factors.34
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The disarray in the courts is even worse:
(1) Half a dozen theories are in vogue among the
various states.
(2) many decisions use - openly or covertly - more
than one theory.
(3) Inconsistency between d3gisions in the samejurisdiction is also common.
Because neither legislatures nor scholars seem to have
developed a sure alternative to the present confusion, con-
flicts law must gather its breath as it waits for the next
breakthrough. 37
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CHAPTER C
CHOICE OF LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
If constitutional principles of federalism serve to order
intersystem relations (and the assumption here is that they
do), it seems quite plain that application and implementation
of the ordering function cannot rest with the states.l
The states of the Union retained their lawmaking power as to
conflict of laws. They even retained their power in interna-
tiona 1 conflict of laws, despite the argument that interna-
tional conflicts are a part of the field of foreign policy
2reserved wholly to the federal government.
It is a curious phenomenon that in the United States the
notion of federalism is usually employed to convey limita-
tions on the national government only, with connecting
3freedom for the states.
However, in matters of choice of law, federalism requires
more than a one-way deference to states' rights: it encom-
passes the obligation of each state to give due deference to
the laws of other states as well as to the needs of the in-
terstate and international system as a whole.4
It is the place of the Supreme Court or some other branch
of the federal government to settle issues that go to the ex-
tent of the states' power vis-a-vis other states or
. 5countrles.
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several forms:
(1) The constitutionalization of a choice of law
(3) The development of a set of outer limits on
This has been criticized as requiring the federal
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Federal control over states' choices of law might take
system. There is, however, a danger in viewing a single
principal constitutional instruments which can and should be
this creates a state of affairs in which future changes are
1 t' 'bl 6a mos lmpossl e.
permits standards or limits to evolve. Therefore, this ap-
11proach should be preferred.
boundaries for permissible choice of law decisions. The
Although the Supreme Court in the past has flirted with
12the possibility of constitutionalizing the choice of law,
choice of law solution as the only constitutional one in that
't . 91 SltS.
state choice of law decisions. Such a negative control is
of law and held that a federal court sitting in a diversity
(2) The development of a federal common law of
choice of law. In Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.7 the
Supreme Court extended the Erie8 doctrine to encompass choice
issues with less bias than state courts would presumably
have.10
used to implement the principles of federalism in the sphere
courts to abdicate an opportunity to resolve choice of law
obviously less intrusive than other approaches and it also
constitutional law is now being viewed as setting only the
case must apply the choice of law rules of the state in which
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of choice of law are: the Due Process clause, the Full Faith
and Credit clause, the Privileges and Immunities clause and
the Equal Protection clause.13
Thus far the Supreme Court has shown extreme caution in
applying these clauses of the Constitution to choice of law
14problems. However the advantages of extended federal con-
trol over choice of law are clear. First, more federal con-
trol would help to produce that uniformity in result which is
a principal goal of conflict of laws. Second, such federal
control would also prevent the harmful results of state
provincialism and jealousy, which is a primary purpose of the
American Constitution.15 Because choice of law involves by
its nature interstate and international matters and not
merely matters of local concern, national solutions are cru-
cial but every exercise of power at that level entails the
destruction or dimunition of state power, with the consequent
weakening of local self-government.16
In the United States, the two prevailing methods for
choice of law are the rules and the policy approach. Choice
of law rules do reflect special value judgments and should
therefore be valid only if in accord with the applicable
principles of substantive justice embodied in the Constitu-
. 17t1on.
To contemporary American lawyers unconstitutional choice
of law rules warrant no special discussion: they will not be
enforced. This view presupposes the suppremacy of constitu-
tional law and the existence of consitutional review by the
Credit clauses indicate that foreign law should be applied
In the following chapters, the extent to which the
residents or aliens. Moreover a state that denies the
53
The only argument that could be made against. d" 18]U lclary.
the specter of discrimination (under the Privileges and Im-
believed to have an interest in the application of its law
is underreaching: Under interest analysis, a state is
Constitutional review becomes somewhat complicated when
constitutional review is that the Framers never intended that
if, but only if, a resident would benefit from the applica-
20tion of that law. Such a resident-centered approach raises
constitutional provisions should be applied to choice of law
A policy approach to choice of law could pose at least
munities or the Equal Protection clause) against non-
rules. However, the American Constitution did not except
h' f I I f 't h 19c Olce 0 aw ru es rom 1 s reac .
two serious constitutional problems. The first such problem
beneficial effects of its rules arguably infringes on the
right to travel.21 The second problem is overreaching,
the constitutional clauses seem to suggest contrasting solu-
tions, e.g., when the Due Process and the Full Faith ~Ed
('..-
namely, the application of local law despite Due Process
I b" 22cause 0 ]ectlons.
decisions will be examined: After an historical introduction
while the Equal Protection clause and the Privileges and
"I 't d 'I 23Irnrnunltlescause pOlnt 0 omestlc aw.
Supreme Court controls and has controlled state choice of law
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on constitutional control in general, the focus will be on
Equal Protection control of choice of law decisions.
The conclusion will be that coexistence of state choice
of law and federal control in a flexible process of decision
is needed, a process that considers both conflict of laws and
constitutional law from the standpoint of doing justice
between the parties.
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CHAPTER D
Court came close to engraving in the Constitution the vested
rights theory associated with Professor Beale and the First
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For in Dick, the language used by
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CONTROL OF CHOICE OF LAW
It is probably safe to say that the "modern era" of con-
In the beginning of this century, it looked as if the
effected through the vague words of the United States
Constitution?l The answer given by the Supreme Court has
varied from time to time and from field to field.2
For many years, the Court exercised no control at all.3
The history of Supreme Court intervention in state choice of
law dates only from the beginning of this century.4 The only
What is the measure of federal control of choice of law
provisions successfully invoked with any regularity are the
Due Process and the Full Faith and Credit clauses.5
Supreme Court would impose a constitutionally derived ter-
ritorial rule on the states.6 At that time, the Supreme
in 1934 to reserve the question whether every problem in con-
flict of laws had become a question of constitutional law.9
Restatement. The leading cases that illustrate this approach
are New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge7 and Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Liebing.8 These decisions led the American Law Institute
stitutional restrictions on choice of law began with the case
. k 10Home Ins. Co. v. D1C .
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the Court could easily be read as adopting a test which took
into account the interests of the involved states.11 In
Dick, a Texas Court was held to have violated the Due Process
Clause by applying the laws of Texas while the only contact
it had to the case was the plaintiff's domicile.12 In other
words, Dick established that the plaintiff's domicile is in-
sufficient by itself for imposition of the forum's law:
Texas, lacking any interest in the insurance contract at
issue, lacked authority under the Constitution to regulate
it.13 Since Dick, the Court has tended to give state courts a
broad discretion to use their own law.14
Because of the economic depression in the 1930's and the
increased state regulations of business in response to this
depression, the Supreme Court became increasingly concerned
. h . 15W1t state 1nterests.
In Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Cornrn'n16the
Court found that both Alaska and California had "a legitimate
public interest" in the resolution of the problem.17 The
solution devised was to weigh those interests "by approving
the governmental interests of each jurisdiction and turning
the scale of decision according to their weight.,,18
Three years later in Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. In-
dustrial Accident Cornrn'n,19Justice Stone did not balance the
interests of the two states. Instead, he determined that the
forum had a substantial interest in the dispute.20 The
Court's concern with states' interests was confirmed by later
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cases, particularly Watson v. Employers' Liability Ins.
21 . 22Corp. and Clay v. Sun Ins. Off1ce Ltd.
After remaining silent on these issues for seventeen
years, the Supreme Court, in 1981, decided the much discussed
23case of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague. There are several im-
24portant aspects of the Hague case. First, by considering
the plaintiff's new residence as a relevant contact with the
forum, Allstate further expands the criteria available to
state courts in selecting their own law. However, the state
of the after-acquired residence could not without further
contact regulate the case for its resident's benefit. There-
fore, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion "found" other con-
tacts between the state and the controversy and the aggrega-
tion of these contacts was said to create Minnesota's inter-
, h d' 25 d h 1 l' ,.est 1n t e 1spute. Secon, t e Hague p ura 1ty op1n10n
further interpreted and equated the Due Process and Full
Faith and Credit clauses. Third, Minnesota was allowed to
apply a controversial new approach to choice of law: the
"better law" approach of Leflar. Finally, since the result in
the case was acceptable only to a plurality rather than a
majority of the justices, it may be that there is no certain
26rule of law to serve as precedent resulting from the case.
It would appear that, Hague was a missed opportunity to
say something meaningful about federal control of modern ap-
proaches in choice of law: Currie's assurances that undue
protectionism would be curtailed by the Equal Protection and
P .. 1 d .. I 27 d th 'fr1V1 eges an Immun1t1es causes an at exceSS1ve orum
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favoritism would be controlled by the Due Process and Full
Faith and Credit clauses are therefore hardly convincing or
. 28reassurlng.
In the jurisdiction and recognition field, however, the
Due Process and Full Faith and Credit clauses have, because
of effective Supreme Court intervention, become unifying ele-
ments of great potency and potentiality. And the con-
sequences of a choice of law decision affect a party much
more severely than does an inconvenient forum.29 This point
was made colorfully by Professor Silberman who said: "To
believe that a defendant's contacts with the forum state
should be stronger under the Due Process clause for jurisdic-
tional purposes than for choice of law, is to believe that an
accused is more concerned with when he will be hanged than
30whether."
One can therefore only hope that the jurisdiction cases
will show the way to intervention by the Court with regard to
choice of law.3l Tolerance for parochialism in choice of law
may have been warranted in the past because it involved few
costs and because it provided doctrinal simplicity. Now,
however, the greater mobility of the people and their greater
tendency to engage in multistate activities has increased the
number of conflicts that arise and has thus decreased the
justification for accepting parochialism.32 It is therefore
time for the Supreme Court to take up it responsibilities as
a disinterested and dispassionate umpire in disputes between
the different passions and interests of the states.33 A set
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of guidelines which will further the notion of justice
underlying the Constitution is needed for choice of law deci-
, k' 34S10n ma lng.
Several modern approaches, based only on favoritism for
local residents, run counter to the established principles of
the American federal system.35 The next chapter will con-
centrate on how these modern approaches might violate the
Equal Protection and Privileges and Immunities clauses.
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CHAPTER E
EQUAL PROTECTION LIMITATIONS ON CHOICE OF LAW IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE
Throughout history, arbitrary geographical boundary
lines have made unjustified differences to the lives of
. 1Amerlcans.
The Framers, aware of this danger, inserted the
Privileges and Immunities Clause into the United States Con-
stitution, designed, at least partly, to minimize friction
among the people of the various states.2 In view of the
Framers' deep commitment to representative government, it
also seems appropriate to suppose that, in placing some con-
straints on states freedom to discriminate against non-
residents, the Framers were moved, in part, by democratic
ideals,3 not to exercise government without the consent of
4the governed.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's deferential attitude
towards the states in the context of conflict of laws, has
encouraged experimentations with new ideas and methodologies
~ I' h' fl' 5 . I blIor reso vlng c Olce o. aw questlons. Specla pro ems
arise, however, when a forum state's decision to apply for-
eign law turns on the residence of the parties, and results
in worse treatment for the non-resident. Discrimination
against non-residents evokes particular concerns in the
constitutional system of the United States not only under the
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Privileges and Immunities Clause, but also under the Equal
Protection Clause.6 It should be stressed that while the
Supreme Court has never invalidated a state's choice of law
decision on the basis of either of the discrimination provi-
sions,7 arguments have been made in some cases that the
choice of law rules applied violated these clauses.8
of Russel Weintraub, one of Currie's followers who has stated
would refuse to apply its own law to its own residents be-
cases of discrimination thanks to utilization of neutral and
This is shown even more clearly by the argument
impersonal choice of law rules. These rules were applied to
all cases in the local courts, irrespective of who the
parties were.10 Brainerd Currie, however, accused the tradi-
The traditional "vested rights" doctrine basically ig-
nored the citizenship of the parties.9 That system minimized
"governmental interest analysis" in order to accept his con-
tional system of choice of law of sweeping discrimination
problems under the rug.11 However, the cases he cites in
support of this contention are, in my opinion, not very
convincing: one has to believe in his methodology, called
that "a form of Equal Protection problem arises if the forum
the forum rule would be advanced by applying it and it such
I. 12c USlons.
contact'. Such a refusal may be based upon an unreasonable
some other geographical location as having the 'decisive
classification of forum residents if the policies underlying
cause the forum's traditional choice of law rule points to
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application would not interfere with the legitimate interest
of any other state."13
14None of the new approaches to choice of law explicitly
discriminate against parties on the basis of state citizen-
h' 15s lp. When such choice of law approaches are not dis-
criminatory on their face, we must now consider whether they
are discriminatory in their application.16
'h f h ,,17 hassume, Wlt out urt er examlnatlon, t at
Modern theories
a state has an
interest in applying its law in order to protect its
domiciliaries or residents but has no such interest in non-
domiciliaries or non-residents.18 Domicile looks like a very
reasonable foundation for modern approaches: it possesses a
rather precise definition and it caters to the general per-
t th t h home.19 B t f t 1 t tcep ion a everyone as au, or a eas wo
reasons, excessive reliance on domicile constitutes the most
important weakness of modern approaches:
(1) it jeopardizes a principle essential to smooth
functioning of federal systems: treating non-residents as
f ' 1 'd t 20 dalr y as reSl en Si an
(2) it also raises problems of whether an in-
dividual ought to be able to get a change of law by deli-
berately acquiring a new domicile after the transaction in
question occurred.21 However, without the basic methodologi-
cal premise --- that states are interested in protecting
their own residents in a way they are not interested in
protecting others --- modern approaches are largely im-
22potent.
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Currie wrote two articles about the constitutionality of
defining protective interests as running only in favor of
23locals. His device to cope with the constitutional problem
was the so-called "intermediate solution" of extending the
protection of forum law to an out-of-stater if he or she was
similarly protected by the law of his or her home state.24
In other words, whether or not nonresidents are accorded
benefits equivalent to those accorded by local law, will
depend on what their legislators have seen fit to do for
them, and that, interest analysists argue, would not be a
. l' f h . 'I d .. 1 25Vl0 atl0n 0 t e PrlVl eges an Immunltles Cause.
However, as Dean Ely points out, this is not the way the
Supreme Court has proceeded under Article IV: there is no
case where the Court has asked what the challenger would be
. 1 d h 26 h "entlt e to at orne. On t e contrary, ln Austln v. New
Hampshire27 the Court held that the content of the chal-
lenger's home state law is irrelevant to a Privileges and Im-
munities challenge:28 "The constitutionality of one State's
statutes affecting nonresidents [cannot] depend upon the
present configuration of the statues of another State."29
Austin thus seems to stand for the proposition that it is not
sufficient under the Privileges and Immunities Clause to
treat people as the laws of their home state would treat
them.30 However, the Court's decision in Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Hague supplies reasons to suppose that the implications of
Austin were not fully considered.31 In Hague, seven of the
eight Justices argued that local residence is a factor on
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which a state may constitutionally rely in applying its own
32
law. It is time for the Supreme Court to clarify this
issue.
Dean Ely offers, if only as the devil's advocate,
Protection issues that lurk within the modern view on choice
they lack political representation.
non-residents. Thus this methodology does not foster a
The Supreme Court has also
reinforcing" interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, he argues that non-residents do not need the protec-
tion of that clause when their obligations are defined by
their own state government, rather than by a state in which
another defense of the constitutionality of modern conflicts
methodologies. 33 In accordance with his "representation-
non-resident's domicile can also frustrate the broader pur-
pose of the Privileges and Immunities Clause: to fuse the
states into a single nation by eliminating differential
treatment of citizens of other states:34 "Automatic approval
However, as Neuman points out, reference to the law of a
of recourse to the law of the domicile maintains rather than
reduces existing differential treatment between residents and
. 1 '. 1,35natlona economlC unlon.
incorporated this fuller vision of national unity into its
Equal Protection analysis, as illustrated by its decision,
involving discriminations against newer residents of a
state.36 As a result, sooner or later the Supreme Court will
have to address these Privileges and Immunities and Equal
of law.
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I will now examine how the Supreme Court could limit
modern choice of law successfully, without restraining the
states completely from applying the choice of law method they
prefer. Therefore, I will go back to the first part of my
analysis: the overview of the impact on constitutional law
of the Equal Protection and Privileges and Immunities
Clause.37
As we have seen, the Equal Protection Clause obviously
has a core focus on racial discrimination. But the Framers
consciously used broad language to comprehend new cir-
cumstances, experiences and insights.
The Warren Court introduced the strict scrutiny test for
laws that classify groups either with respect to fundamental
interests or on the basis of suspect criteria. The Burger
Court, in turn, developed an intermediate standard of review.
Non-residency has not been held to be a suspect class-
ification and is thus not subject to strict Equal Protection
scrutiny but only to mere rationality review.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause was plainly in-
tended to prevent discrimination against out-of-staters. But
unfortunately, the current Privileges and Immunities doctrine
rests application of the clause on whether or not the
Privilege or Immunity claimed is "fundamental."
The conclusion of this constitutional law analysis was
that the Supreme Court now interprets the Equal Protection
Clause to limit state power to discriminate against in-state
aliens more severely than it has ever limited state power to
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discriminate against out-of-state citizens or non-residents
under both the Privileges and Immunities and the Equal
Protection Clause.
Professor Simson argues that it is not likely that the
Framers intended coverage by the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of a particular privilege or immunity to depend on
whether they are "in their nature fundamental." According to
S· 38lmson:
(1) "the relationship between the fundamental or
non-fundamental character of a Privilege or Immunity and the
amount of interstate friction generated by its selective
denial to non-residents is highly speculativei39 and
(2) "the fundamental or non-fundamental nature of a
right is irrelevant to the extent to which a law that dis-
criminates against non-residents with regard to the enjoyment
of that right satisfies democratic norms."40
Therefore, Professor Simson is in favor of a new stand-
ard of review, that invalidates any residence classification
not shown by the state to be necessary to serve a significant
t b· t' 41sta e 0 Jec lve.
As has been stated before, in the author's opinion,42
classifications that distinguish between residents and
non-residents are suspect and should thus be subjected to the
strict scrutiny test of the Equal Protection Clause. These
classifications are suspect because they tend to bring about
disadvantages to persons with little or no formal or informal
input into the lawmaking process.43 Non-residents neither
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sit in nor otherwise materially influence the state legisla-
ture, while residents fill its every seat.44
For at least three reasons, this author considers the
Equal Protection Clause to be a better basis for a constitu-
tional test of modern approaches than the Privileges and Im-
.. 1 45munltles Cause:
(1) The Privileges and Immunities Clause never has
been a meaningful vehicle for judicial review of state ac-
tions. On the contrary, thanks to the relative simplicity of
the Equal Protection Clause and to the large number of cases
in which the Supreme Court has been called upon to consider
it, its significance is much less obscure than that of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.
(2) The Equal Protection Clause is broader in its
application: aliens, corporations and residents are within
its protection. The Privileges and Immunities Clause only
applies to non-residents.
(3) Laws which place non-residents at a disadvan-
tage as to rights not fundamental for the purposes of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, overstep the bounds of
reasonableness set by the Equal Protection Clause.
Under this author's analysis, the Supreme Court should
undertake a further revision of its interpretations of Equal
Protection limitations on the action of states and more
specifically on the choice-of-law decisions of states.
The Court should clarify that, although the Equal
Protection Clause does not obligate a state with
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decision-making authority to exercise its authority in favor
of any particular choice-of-law approach, these antidis-
crimination guarantees against discrimination of the effect
of undermining the legitimacy of several choice of law
methodologies in current use.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER E
3. Simson, supra note 2, at 384.
1. Neuman, Territorial Discriminatino, Equal Protection
and Self Determination, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 262 (1987).
'ey
·l":e
4. Simson, supra note 2, at 384.
6. Neuman, supra note 1, at 319.
5. Note, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Con-
flict of Laws, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 287 (1977).
7. Note, supra note 5, at 274. In the latest edition
of Cramton, Currie and Kay, Conflict of Laws 429 (4th ed.,
1987) the Supreme Court case of Supreme Court of New
Hampshire v. Pifer, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) is cited as an ex-
ample of Supreme Court control over choice of law. In my
opinion, however, that was not a conflicts problem (there
were no conflicting laws) but merely a constitutional
problem. But See: Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Acc.
Comm'n, 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021 (1926): "A privilege anq.
protection of the laws of a substantive nature is .•• ac-
corded to citizens of this state and denied to citizens of
other states. This is forbidden by the Federal Constitu-
tion." In this case, strangely enough, the Court did not
nullify the statute, but extended the privilege to non-
resident employees.
See: Commonwealth v. Mong, 60 Ohio St. 455, 117 N.E. 2d
32 (1954): "Subjecting an Ohio resident to the making of
support payments, compulsory under the law of another state,
as to which payments the law of Ohio specifically exempts all
Ohio citizens similarly situated, is violative of his right
to Equal Protection."
2. Simson, Discrimination Against Non-Residents and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 128 U. Pa•.i"l!t.
Rev. 379, 383 (1979) •
8. ~, Skahill v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 234 F.
Supp. 906 (D.C.N.Y. 1964); Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y. 2d
121, 286 N.E. 2d 454, 335 N.Y.S. 2d 64 (1972); The reasoning
of Justice Stone's famous footnote in United States v.
Carolene Products, Inc., 304 U.S. 152 N.Y. (1938), has not
been tested in the choice of law context. The reasoning is
based upon some vague notion that everyone who is affected by
a political decision ought to have a right to participate in
making that decision. Justice Stone argued that "groups
whose discrete and insular status effectively excludes them
from the political process, qualify for heightened concern."
For a complete analysis see Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts
74
and the Fate of the "Inside-Outsider," 134 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1291 (1986).
9. Therefore, they hardly every discrimitate on their
face.
10. Currie, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Con-
flict of Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 145
(1964) .
11. Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 420
(1963): "A forthright statement of the interest of the state
in protecting its own purchasers would bring to light ques-
tions of discrimination long obscured by the pietism of con-
flict of laws law, and they are not single problems; but they
ought to be brough to light and resolved, not swept under the
rug by formulas that compromise state policy."
12. See cases cited in Currie, supra note 11, at 572.
13. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 572
(1986). As you will see further, the problem with this kind
of argument is that Interest Analysis tends to ignore or
downplay interests that are based on something else than
party residence. In my opinion, a rules approach does not
violate antidiscrimination clauses because the Body of Law
imposed through the system of neutral and impartial rules on
non-residents, is, on the average, no less favorable than the
body of law imposed on local residents. In other words,
rules have (if applied properly) the common advantage that
they take the law referred to either way and not simply if
they favor one or the other party.
14. By "new approaches" this author means governmental
interest analysis and "related theories" such as the better
rule of law.
15. A choice of law rule that expressly required ap-
plication of whichever law was most favorable to the party
from the forum state would be an example of such an explicit
discrimination; Note, supra note 5, at 287.
16. Note, supra note 5, at 287.
17. That assumption went unquestioned until 1980, when
an investigation of the assumption caused it to crumple like
wet paper; See Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of
Legislative Intent, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 392 (1980): She argues
that the normative assertion that states have no business
protecting anyone but their own citizens, is not supported by
case law or by common sense: "this talk about interest is a
fiction and their premises are metaphysical."
75
18. Corr, Interest Analysis and Choice of Law: The
Dubious Dominance of Domicile, 1083 Utah L. Rev. 651, 666
(1983) .
19. Corr, supra note 18, at 676.
20. See further for an elaborate analysis.
21. See: Corr, supra note 18 for an excellent analysis,
Brilmayer, supra note 17, at 410.
22. Ely, Choice of Law and the States' Interest in
Protecting Its Own, 23 W. & M. L. Rev. 173 (1981); The ques-
tion then is whether we should reintroduce hard and fast
rules that work injust and encourage evasion, or whether we
should retain non-rule approaches that may be unconstitu-
tional.
23. Currie, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Con-
flict of Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 145
(1964): Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination
in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 Yale
L. J. 1323 (1960).
24. Currie, supra note 11 at 504; For critical remarks
see: Ely, supra note 22, at 183.
25. Ely, supra note 22, at 185.
26. Ely, supra note 22, at 186.
27. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
28. Ely, supra note 22, at 186.
29. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 668 (1975).
30. Ely, supra note 22, at 186; Ely further concludes
that if Austin is right as written, the dominant modern
choice of law theory is unconstitutional: "It undercuts the
entire methodology by indicating that, whenever a state would
claim an interest in enforcing its protective policy on the
ground that the party its law would protect is a local resi-
dent, it is obligated by the United States Constitution to
claim a similar interest in protecting out-of-staters, ir-
respective of what their home state laws provide."
31. Ely, supra note 22, at 187. Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 449 U.S . 302 (1981).
32. Ely, supra note 22, at 188; The opinion in Hague did
not even mention Austin.
76
41. See Chapter I.
44. Simson, supra note 42, at 86.
Neuman, supra note 1, at 323.
Neuman, supra note 1, at 323.
Neuman, supra note 1, at 321.
See Chapter 1.
Ely supra note 22, at 190; Neuman, supra note 221,33.
at 322.
34.
35.
36.
37.
43. Simson, supra note 42, at 86.
39. Simson, supra note 38, at 385.
38. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1823); Simson, Discrimination Against Non-Residents and
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 128 u.
Pa. L. Rev. 379 (1979).
42. Simson, State Autonomv in Choice of Law: A Sug-
gested Approach, 52 S. Cal. L.~Rev. 61, 86 (1978).
40. Simson, supra note 38, at 388; His new standard is
strikingly similar to the intermediate used by the Supreme
Court in Equal Protection cases.
45. The major ambiguity in the Clause lurks in the
phrase "within its jurisdiction." For an analysis see:
Currie, supra note 10, at 529.
CHAPTER F
CONCLUSION
"Ye shall have one manner of law as well for the
stranger, as for one of your own country."l
As we have seen, the last thirty years have witnessed a
fundamental change in the landscape of choice of law
doctrines in the United States. The traditional system for
choice of law in the United States was embodied in the First
Restatement and was based on the "vested rights theory". The
system consisted of a few broad hard and fast rules, coupled
with an array of escape devices. Now, this traditional
framework has been discredited and replaced by a series of
mutually incompatible methodologies. But all these modern
approaches have in common a critical attitude towards
mechanical choice of law rules and the desire to make choice
of law more responsive to the demands of substantive
policies.
Of greater interest, however, is whether modern theories
offer superior alternatives: Several modern approaches,
seemingly based only on favoritism for local residents, run
counter to the established principles of the American federal
system, embodied in the Privileges and Immunities and Equal
Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution.
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Even apart from those constitutional problems, it seems
unfair to let justice depend on who sues whom and where:
modern approaches thus raise fundamental questions about
interstate and international justice. Their modus operandi
is resort to a single issue and this is sometimes highly
unfair to non-residents.
Moreover, even if judges were only "les bouches de la
loin as Currie argues, it has been shown convincingly that
state legislatures themselves tend not to exclude strangers
from the benefits of domestic reforms.2
However, thus far the Supreme Court has never in-
validated a state's choice of law decision on the basis of
either of the two antidiscrimination clauses. As shown
above, this author has argued that it is time for the Supreme
Court to take up its responsibilities in this respect. This
author suggested the use of the strict scrutiny test of the
Equal Protection Clause to review residence based class-
ifications. But this whole analysis also brings up the old
dispute: whether there should be rules, or in the alterna-
tive, whether there should be approaches in choice of law?
In this author's opinion, there are two possible directions
for choice of law methodology: opting for a modern approach
in a narrow constitutional context or a return to a more
rule-oriented approach. Of course, such a return should be a
careful one (to avoid the manipulation of choice of law
results via escape devices as in the traditional system).3
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But before choosing a particular direction, let us
observe some recent European trends in choice of law metho-
dology. With Professor Schlessinger, the author strongly
believes in the value of comparison as an antidote to "an
unperceptive and uncritical attitude toward one's own law."4
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PART III. A SIDE GLANCE AT THE COMMON MARKET
CHAPTER A
INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN CONFLICTS SYSTEM
"Comparative law has one incontestable virtue: it shows
a greater range of possible solutions to a specific problem
than any particular legal system can boast of."l
Generalizations respecting the methodology of European
conflicts law are more difficult to make and less accurate
than are generalizations respecting thinking over these mat-
ters in the United States.2 The task that I undertake is
thus one of extreme difficulty. The following summary of
current developments should therefore be read with cautious
scepticism. My only excuse is my hope that this brief intro-
duction may induce the reader to form his own opinion by
reading the original texts.
Because of the mobility of persons and transactions,
Europe has become as much of a "conflicts paradise" as the
United States.3 There is no unified European choice of law
method -- though some work in this direction has been done in
the framework of the European Community.4
Most of the European countries still adhere to the
jurisdiction-selecting methods:5 systems that select the
legal order which is to control the choice of law issue
81
82
without particular regard to how the various concerned legal
orders wish to regulate the matters in question.6
The jurisdiction-selecting rules formulated by the First
Restatement are somewhat similar to those current in Western
Europe: both incorporate the two-state process of:
(1) characterization; and
(2) selecting a connecting factor.7
However, there the analogy ends: European rules are based on
Savigny's ideal of decisional harmony while American rules
find their foundations in the Vested Rights Theory.
Only recently, European lawyers and the courts in the
Federal Republic of Germany have recognized that constitu-
tional law affects choice of law decisions.8
Although American and European conflicts law have a com-
mon background --- the labors of glossatora and commentators
who, in Italy, made the conflicts law a science --- there are
basic differences which need to be explained:9 whereas the
common-law lawyer argues from case to case, the civil-law
lawyer primarily deduces his conclusions from statutory
provisions in the form of choice of law rules. He has to
discover and formulate the general principle governing his
decision and there is no prima facie presumption in favor of
internal substantive law.10
Also, the principle of legal certainty is of greater im-
portance in Europe than in the United States where
courts feel more inclined to attribute primary importance to
th t· fl' f' d' .d 1 11e sa 1S actory so ut10n 0 1n 1V1 ua cases.
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Most conflicts cases in the United States are interstate
rather than international, the states share a common language
and legal heritage and they are part of a federal system.12
In Europe, however, questions of private international law
mainly concern the relationship between the domestic system
as a whole and foreign legal systems with differing substan-
tive laws: problems are more truly international.13
In Europe, some nations do not accord constitutional law
primacy and even in countries which grant primacy to con-
stitutional law, it is disputable that courts with constitu-
tional review jurisdiction should invalidate unconstitutional
conflicts rules.14 In the United States the primacy of con-
stitutional law and the power of judicial review is estab-
lished.15
The most important difference between traditional
European and modern American methodologies lies, as Kegel
points out, in their view of the relation between substantive
law and the conflict of laws.16 Traditionally, substantive
law and conflicts were entirely different things: substan-
tive law aims at the materially best solution while conflicts
law aims at the spatially (and materially) best solution.17
American reformers, however, allowed the conflict of laws to
become largely absorbed into substantive law so that choice
of law rules almost disappeared. In order to reach a choice
of law decision, American reformers start with an analysis of
the substantive laws, while Europeans still "blindly" deter-
mine which law to apply.18 The American point of departure
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revolution.
a closer look at the European reaction to the American
American conflicts thinkers misconceives the different tasks
In practice, however, the im-
very narrow particular choice of law rules, while European
conflicts law maintained widely formulated rules.19 Accord-
from substantive rules lead to ad hoc decisions or at best to
The American conflicts revolution has stirred sig-
ing to Professor Kegel, the methodology followed by modern
of both legal areas --- substantively correct solution within
substantive law, spatially correct solution within interna-
tional or interstate private law.20 In his opinion, conflict
of laws is a system of itself and should thus operate without
too much reference to the substantive laws underlying it.
. f· t db· 21nl lcan e ate ln Europe.
pact of the American revolution has been felt only in a few
European countries.22 In the following chapter, we will take
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CHAPTER B
EUROPEAN REACTION TO THE "CONFLICTS REVOLUTION"
"Law must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still."l
The writings of Professor Brainerd Currie have been very
important in the development of European interest in the
American approach to conflict of laws.2 Currie's purpose in
proposing new methodologies was to have conflicts problems
solved in the same way that domestic cases were decided and
no longer by jurisdiction-selecting rules imported from
3Europe.
At first, the Europeans were moved by intellectual
curiosity about the modern American approaches: they at-
tempted to describe and analyze American developments.4 As
early as 1964, Kegel devoted his Hague lecture, which he en-
titled "The Crisis of Conflict of Laws" to a description and
critique of Currie's and Ehrenzweig's theories.5 Since then,
many European authors have devoted considerable space in
their articles,6 monographs7 and book reviews8 to evaluating
and criticising modern American approaches.9 Their main
criticism was directed against the unprincipled ad hoc
decision-making, the forum shopping, the legal insecurity,
the overriding importance to the problem of jurisdiction as
opposed to choice of law and the homeward trend in the modern
Am . h 10er~can approac es.
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Even though there are many European studies on the
Instead, what happened in Europe must be considered not as a
The pressures for change were feltfl .b' 1 . 12greater eXl 1 lty.
was direct as well as indirect: In 1964, the United States
If any American theory has been coherently influential
of the excessive reliance on nationality as the connecting
factor.13
primarily in the field of domestic relations probably because
In practice, American influence on European developments
fluenced European private international law by way of inter-
revolution but as an evolution of the existing system towards
conflicts treatise which advocates any American approach as a
substitute for the traditional European conflicts methods.11
American conflicts revolution, I know of no leading European
jointed the Hague Conference of Private International Law.
Since then, American conflicts theories have directly in-
to the indirect influence of American thoughts on European
national treaties drafted with American participation and en-
.. f' . 14 1 .terlng lnto orce ln European countrles. Any conc USlon as
choice of law thinking and practice involves much specula-
tion.15 It is, however, legitimate to assert that American
in Europe, it is the "most significant relationship" test of
applicable to cases with foreign elements by using
the Second Restatement, whose moderate position was very ap-
17pealing to Europeans. The tradition of selecting the law
thinking has stimulated reconsideration of the traditional
16rules for choice of law in European legal systems.
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appropriate connecting factors was strongly rooted in
European theory and practice. Therefore, when the need for
more flexibility in conflict rules was felt, it was rela-
tively easy to adopt flexible rather than rigid connecting
factors.18
Another trend detectable in Europe relates to the
t t . f th k t' 1 1 . 19pro ec lon 0 e wea er par y ln a ega transactlon.
This tendency shows that European countries now pay greater
of policy analysis, the European courts made use of their
"directly applicable laws" has been recommended to American
ably that the new American theories have been difficult to
The explanation is prob-
attention to the social realities underlying legal develop-
20ments. However, even in such instances with a slight touch
Why is it that American ideas had no more impact on
On the other hand, concepts developed in European con-
traditional methods: they either created new conflicts rules
as an exception or as an alternative to a formerly comprehen-
sive general rule or they applied such tools as the public
policy exception to avoid clashes between the lex fori and
th d . t d f . 1 21e eSlgna e orelgn aWe
flicts scholarship have been noticed in the United States and
some interaction seemed to take place. Thus, the concept of
lawyers as a possible method for contributing to the develop-
ment of American conflicts laws.22
E th' k' d t . ?23uropean ln lng an prac lce.
apply to the European situation because of the basic dif-
f . h' . f fl' 1 24 h 1 1erences ln t elr Vlews 0 con lCtS aw: T e centra ro e
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of values as simplicity, certainty, equality and predict-
ability in the European conflicts tradition prevented adop-
tion of interest analysis approaches.25 Moreover, any
successful system based on policy analysis, presupposes a
certain common background and, in my opinion, a certain
26degree of federal control. Such a common background, based
on the English heritage, still exists in the United States
notwithstanding numerous differences in the statutes and in
the interpretation of the Common Law.27 This author has
argued before that federal control should be strengthened by
28the Supreme Court.
In the next chapter, the author will discuss the
relationship between choice of law and constitutional or
European law in Europe and the possible influence of modern
American approaches in this field.
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CHAPTER C
LIMITATIONS ON EUROPEAN CONFLICTS RULES
European legislators and courts have for too long ig-
nored constitutional and European law as setting boundaries
for permissible choice of law rules and decisions.1
What is the significance of the European Community for
choice of law decisions made by its Member States?2 Even in
Europe, very few people have yet asked this question.3 The
European Community offers standards of conduct to Member
States in the field of economic and social relations.4 But
problems of conflicts law were not dealt with in any substan-
tial way in the treaties establishing the Communities.5
As Fletcher points out, three varieties of conflicts ex-
ist because of the creation of the European Communities:
conflicts between the national and Community legal order,
conflicts between the Member States and conflicts between the
Community legal order and legal systems of other countries,
whether members of the Community or not.6 American readers
will certainly perceive certain parallels between these
situations and those they encounter in the perennial pheno-
menon of a fixed yet fluctuating federal-state relationship.7
Just like the judge in a system regulated by a federal
constitution, who must respect the limitations which the no-
tion of constitutionality imposes upon his scope for reaching
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his decision, the national judge in the European Communities
exercises freedom of action only within certain defined
I' . t 8lml s. However, it is far from being the case that the
European Community has yet succeeded in transforming itself
9into a federalized system.
Conflicts between Community and national rules are
governed by the Supremacy Principle: the Community law, by
, f 't . 1 t 10 d ' dvlrtue 0 1 sown specla na ure an conceptl0n, comman s
supreme force within the domestic legal order of every Member
State.11
With regard to "internal" conflicts cases, Article 220
of the Treaty contains limited provisions for the progressive
substitution of unified rules of Private International Law.12
Member States should make genuine efforts to accelerate the
rate of progress in this area, which has been disappointingly
13slow. The national courts, in responding to a conflicts
problem, should enlist the assistance of the European Court
of Justice by means of a reference pursuant to Article 177 of
the Treaty. The Court is well qualified to undertake the
sort of comparative investigation which the question may well
require, and its ruling will thereafter constitute a
source of reference and inspiration for all courts in all
Member States.14
One of the conflicts provisions that one can find in the
Treaty is Article 7, requiring that the prohibition against
any discrimination on grounds of nationality would be fully
respected by every Member State.15 However, the principle of
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non-discrimination does not occupy an important place as a
limit on a country's choice of law decisions. There is not
yet any clear "European test" available.16 This is very
surprising if one considers how much attention the non-
17discrimination principle recently got in substantive law.
lvith respect to the situation in the individual Member
States,it was mentioned before that for the important
problems concerning the relation between conflicts and con-
stitutional law to arise, constitutional law should be ac-
corded primacy and judicial review must exist to implement
h . 18t at prlmacy:
(1) In England there exists no power of
judicial review.
no influence at all on choice of law decisions. According to
(2) In Germany, there is a power of review,
concentrated in the Federal Constitutional
Court.
(3) In the United States, there exists a
diffused system of judicial review: ever~9
court can refuse to apply a certain law.
Until recently, national constitutional principles had
some conflicts thinkers, choice of law rules are simply
neutral, formal provisions, rules of expediency, devoid of
substantive justice and thus rules of Private International
h ld b b· t t' I .t . 20Law s ou not e su Ject 0 any na 10na constl utl0n.
it will be argued later, this view ignores the necessity of
more international justice: in Europe rules are not always
neutral or value free.21 A landmark decision of the German
Constitutional Court ignited a European "revolution" by
As
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establishing an interaction between constitutional principles
and choice of law.22 The American emphasis on the importance
of constitutional law in the conflicts area (especially with
respect to jurisdiction) has undoubtedly influenced this
European development.
This decision and its implications for German (European)
choice of law rules are examined below.
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CHAPTER D
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION CLAUSES WITH RESPECT
TO CHOICE OF LAW
The phenomenon of massive immigration in industrialized
Europe forced some European countries and especially Germany
to rethink their excessive reliance on nationality as a con-
necting factor in choice of law decisions.1
The Garcia decision of the German Constitutional Court2
has probably attracted more attention than any other case in
the history of German conflicts law. In that case, both Ger-
man conflicts rules and German or foreign substantive law
were held to be subject to constitutional review.3
The facts were simple: A Spaniard intended to get
married to a divorced German woman. Under the German Civil
Code, marriage is, with respect to either spouse, governed by
the law of the state to which he or she is a national. Con-
sequently, a foreigner has to produce a marriage license from
the authorities of his country or has to apply for an exemp-
tion from this requirement. In this case, the Court of Ap-
peals in Germany had refused to grant an exemption on the
ground that under Spanish law the divorce, even of a foreign
civil marriage would not be recognized and that therefore the
proposed marriage would be regarded as bigamous.4
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The Federal Constitutional Court held that the conflicts
rule of reference to the nationality of the parties was sub-
ject to constitutional review but that in this case it did
not violate constitutional guarantees.5 Reference to the law
to which a person owes allegiance and with which he or she is
presumably most familiar would seem to accord with the intent
of prospective spouses.6 Nor could the idea of protecting
the stability of marriages be faulted: Germany made
reference to the national law of both persons to avoid that
the marriage would not be recognized in their horne
countries.7 However, the Court also held that the applica-
tion of Spanish law would infringe the constitutional right
of freedom of marriage and that therefore Spanish law could
not be applied.8 This holding comports with recent American
thinking that a court should look at the content of poten-
tially applicable laws.9
From this 1971 case, it was unclear whether German
choice of law rules which connect the solution of problems in
International Family Law to only one of the spouse's (usually
the husband's) nationality, were in harmony with the
Constitution's requirement that men and women are to be
10treated equally. At the end of 1982, the Federal Supreme
Court (Bundesgerichshoff) decided that the choice of law rule
which subjected the dissolution of a marriage between spouses
of different, non-German, nationalities to the lex patriae of
the husband was not constitutional.ll In February, 1983, the
Federal Constitutional Court had the occasion to consider the
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rule according to which a married couple's matrimonial
property regime is to be governed by the lex patriae of the
husband at the time of the marriage. The Court had no doubts
that the rule was also in conflict with the Article in the
C . t' . l' f 12onst~tu ~on guarantee~ng equa ~ty 0 sexes.
The requirement that choice of law provisions must
comply with constitutional precepts forced the German legis-
lator to review a substantial segment of the German statutory
conflicts rules.13
For other European countries, the answer to the question
of how they can incorporate equality principles in domestic
conflict rules, remains uncertain. American and German ex-
periences should encourage them in developing more just
choice of law methodologies.
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tators have argued that conflict with Equal Rights principles
may be avoided by giving the parties freedom to choose the
applicable law among the common national law of the parties,
the national law of one of the parties and the law of the
place of residence. As Muller-Freienfels points out this
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proposal neglects an important consideration: In marriage
law, public policy considerations restrict the parties'
freedom to alter their obligations inter sei see Muller-
Freienfels, Conflicts of Law and Constitutionar-Law, 45 u.
Chi. L~ Rev. 598, 606 (1978).
13. Dickson, supra note 6 at 231 gives an overview of
the modifications.
CHAPTER E
CONCLUSION
As has been shown, there is no "international" Private
International Law: it is American, Californian, European and
German Private International Law.
A universal system of choice of law is a utopia, but
this ideal may help to determine the direction in which prac-
tical action should move. After the initial radicalism of
opposed views is over, it should be possible to come
gradually to at least a degree of "rapprochement" between
European and American methodologies. It is with this goal in
mind that I made this brief comparative analysis.
First, some of the basic differences between American
and European conflicts law were explained. I pointed out
that the most important difference lies in the opposing views
of the relation between substantive law and the conflict of
laws.
Second, European reactions to the American "conflicts
revolution" were examined. The conclusion was that American
thinking has stimulated an evolution of European choice of
law rules towards greater flexibility.
Third, it was shown that the path towards European in-
tegration is long and difficult: sofar European law has had
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no notable influence on choice of law decisions by Member
States.
Fourth, the author argued that European countries should
adopt the principles set forth by the German Constitutional
Court that choice of law rules must comply with constitu-
tional equality precepts.
A factual basis for "rapprochement" between European and
American choice of law methodologies already exists: the
unprecedented mobility of persons and transactions allover
the world.
In this paper the author did not really want to promote
one method as the best for all choice of law decisions
everywhere. The author only hopes that the softening of the
hard and often discriminatory choice of law rules in European
countries may develop further, under American influence.
But, the author also believes 'that some modern American
methodologies have, in recent years, been overly preoccupied
with problems of narrow local concern. Observation of
European trends might suggest that there are broader issues
___ such as international harmony and equality --- which
deserve attention.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
In this paper, the author confronted the premise, widely
invoked in modern American choice of law thinking, that a
state has a greater interest in protecting its own citizens
or residents than it has in protecting others, using an-
tidiscrimination clauses of the United States Constitution.
The author argued that classifications that distinguish
local residents from out-of-staters are suspect and that they
should therefore be subjected to the highest Equal Protection
scrutiny.
The comparison with European conflicts thinking was
meant to explain that conflicts justice is not perceived in
similar terms in Europe and in the United States.
Conflicts justice in the United States is viewed as a
case by case attempt to achieve justice in substantive terms.
Conflicts law is conceived as adjective law, that is, as the
mechanism for reaching the right result. In most states of
the Union, there is a wide common basis of tradition and sub-
stantive principles; conflicts usually arise from details in
legislation. This common background explains the success of
Interest Analysis related methodologies in American courts.
However, the idea that multistate problems call for an
analysis of the reach of local rules is, in my opinion,
strikingly parochial.
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Moreover, justice in the individual case also means that
such an important goal as equality should not have to yield
to the inwardlooking (or parochial) results often reached by
modern American approaches. Federal concerns (for equal
protection) call as much for attention in the choice of law
process as do the concerns of the parties or of the par-
ticular forum. Decision-makers are representatives not only
of their own nation-state, but also of the larger collective
community and therefore preference for forum residents should
be avoided by them.
But, as long as state conflicts decisions are subject
only to the outer limits of constitutional control, a great
deal of parochialism will continue to prevail. The Supreme
Court has the power and the authority for activism in con-
trolling state choice of law decisions. It should be used.
In Europe, conflict of laws interest in the application
of this or that substantive law, that is European conflicts
justice, demands that the same scope of application be ac-
corded to every substantive law, domestic as well as foreign.
European legal systems assign an ordering function to con-
flicts law and thus view it as a separate body of law which
determines the applicable law in a neutral and objective
fashion, without regard to the substantive result. There-
fore, the most basic test of European conflicts rules is that
they be formally just. The German Constitutional Court
realized this in its holdings that equality of sexes should
be respected when choosing the applicable law for family
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relations. Other European countries such as Belgium should
follow the German example and review their conflict rules as
to their conformity with constitutional principles of
equality.
Finally, the author would like to address a somewhat
broader issue: What is the wisdom of applying local law to
multistate or international realities? Complete equal treat-
ment can only be assured if a uniform system of non-
discriminatory choice of law rules is accepted by all states
and countries and if this system is uniformly administered.
This is clearly an unattainable ideal. However, treaties and
cooperation on an international level can help develop a more
uniform approach and thus close the gap between American and
European conflicts law. Non-discrimination across the bound-
aries is a value thereby to be respected.
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